Marco Cappelluti

Electoral support for far-right parties is often linked to geographies of discontent. We argue that public service deprivation, defined as reduced access to public services, plays an important role in explaining these patterns. By exploiting an Italian reform that reduced access to public services in municipalities with fewer than 5,000 residents, we show that far-right support in national elections increased in municipalities affected by the reform compared to unaffected ones. We use geo-coded individual-level survey data and party rhetoric data to explore the mechanisms underlying this result. Our findings suggest that concerns about immigration are exacerbated by the reform, and that far-right parties increasingly linked public services to immigration in their rhetoric after the reform. These demand and supply dynamics help us understand how public service deprivation shapes geographic patterns in far-right support.

What explains the link between labor market insecurity and support for far-right parties in Europe? Prevailing theories suggest that far-right parties appeal to economically insecure individuals by capitalizing on concerns related to globalization, labor market shifts, and trade shocks. While existing research focuses on material self-interest and status considerations, this paper proposes a complementary mechanism centered on psychological disaffection. It argues that labor market insecurity fosters feelings of uncertainty and lack of control, which lower identification with social identities and reinforce nativist attitudes. The analysis combines cross-sectional survey data with original panel data from Italy, and shows that labor market insecurity is associated with higher economic uncertainty, nativist sentiment, political withdrawal and far-right support, alongside lower group identification. The findings highlight the importance of non-material responses to economic insecurity and offer a psychological dimension of the effects of labor market insecurity on far-right support.

The rise of far-right parties is often attributed to economic discontent. This paper centers on public service retrenchment. It argues that in advanced democracies, citizens' expectations of democratic functioning are closely tied to the state's provision of public services. When services are retrenched, citizens are more likely to become discontented with democracy and mainstream parties, and to support anti-democratic platforms. Among these, they are more likely to become receptive to far-right parties, who push against democratic elites and message swift, unmediated economic action. The paper tests this argument by leveraging a 2011 reform in Italy that randomized municipal control over local budgeting. Using municipal-level electoral and administrative data, I find that exposure to the reform significantly increased support for far-right parties in national elections. Notably, the reform led to significant declines in public service provision in affected municipalities. Additional evidence from geo-coded individual-level panel data supports the proposed mechanism: affected voters report lower satisfaction with democracy. The findings integrate the literature on the electoral implications of economic hardship and highlight how public service provision shapes perceptions of democratic legitimacy and far-right support.

The rise of far-right and Eurosceptic parties in Europe is often attributed to economic discontent. Austerity has become an economically defining feature of post-crisis politics in Europe and is widely seen as a catalyst for the rise of Euroscepticism and far-right parties. Yet, its political consequences remain contested. This paper argues that in advanced democracies, fiscal retrenchment produces political backlash -- and this impact is also conditional on how voters interpret fiscal retrenchment, whom they blame for it, and their broader political-economic preferences. I test this argument using data from the United Kingdom and Spain, two countries that implemented austerity under different institutional constraints. Combining subnational administrative data on austerity and national election results with geo-coded individual-level panel surveys, I show that exposure to austerity increased both far-right support and Eurosceptic attitudes, particularly among voters who oppose austerity, who reject economic integration, and who blame the European Union for fiscal tightening. These findings show that the political backlash to austerity interacts with voters' predispositions to produce divergent outcomes -- amplifying discontent among some categories. The results contribute to a more stratified understanding of how economic shocks interact with individual characteristics to translate into far-right voting in advanced democracies.